Wittgenstein and Hegel by Jakub Mácha Alexander Berg

Author:Jakub Mácha, Alexander Berg
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Walter de Gruyter GmbH
Published: 2019-03-06T16:00:00+00:00

2Sense certainty

Let me now focus on the finer structure of the point at the other end of Wittgenstein’s arc, the Philosophical Investigations. Here, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit presents itself as a natural comparative standard, containing a corresponding arc that stretches from an initial critique of attempts to provide significance by pointing to the world, that is by ostensive definition, to knowledge primarily conceived as a social institution. The peculiar structural feature of this arc is its overall negative quality, in which no part of the argument is an outspokenly positive standpoint but instead a refutation of some previous, seemingly natural concept of knowledge.

Both Wittgenstein and Hegel believe that scepticism arising from this negative journey might be brought to a cautiously optimistic conclusion connected to the essential sociality of reason. This conclusion is, in fact, what Kripke (1982) in his famous reading of Wittgenstein calls a sceptical solution to the sceptical paradox. It corresponds to Hegel’s transformation of knowledge from a path of despair to the path of progress. Hence, the general congruence of Hegel’s and Wittgenstein’s endeavours, as I intend to show, is guaranteed by:

(1) the similar structure of the first parts of the Philosophical Investigations and Phenomenology of Spirit, and

(2) the consequences that this isomorphism has for the resulting concept of knowledge.

Let me start with (1). This first and rather obvious similarity is reflected in the opening sections of the respective books, which deny the idea (on which “natural consciousness” is based) that there is a direct link between our knowledge and its object. In the analytic tradition of Russell and Wittgenstein, this link goes back to the idea of words functioning as names for objects external to them, with their relation being based on ostensive definition. Hegel’s chapter on sense certainty deals with this very problem (to the extent that one can say, following Solomon (1983: p.326), that “whether or not Russell ever read his Hegel […], Hegel knew his Russell”) by deconstructing the presupposition that ostensive definition works in this way. The seemingly rich and direct meaning assignments by proclamations and gestures such as “here” and “now”, which according to Russell are the only true names, are shown to be the most empty and indirect ones.

As Lamb (1980: pp.77–78)—mutatis mutandis—put it: if it is in the immediacy of the “here” and “now” that you find knowledge, then tell me what it is that you know. And if your reply is, “I know that there is a table in front of me”, you are bringing in other matters. You are making a classification, thus mediating the alleged immediacy. And finally:

If I say that this stapling machine is eight inches from my nose at 10 p.m. on the 18th March 1978, I have brought in a reference to the whole history of mankind. (ibid.)

And this is also exactly what Wittgenstein was aiming at. He does not deny the importance of ostensive definition, but stresses that the act of pointing out or naming something requires the whole stage on which it can be played (PI: §257).

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